Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of Lawyers by Bernstein, Anita
Brooklyn Law School
BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship
1-2009
Pitfalls Ahead: A Manifesto for the Training of
Lawyers
Anita Bernstein
Brooklyn Law School, anita.bernstein@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Legal Education Commons, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons,
and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
94 Cornell L. Rev. 479 (2008-2009)
ESSAY
PITFALLS AHEAD: A MANIFESTO FOR THE
TRAINING OF LAWYERS
Anita Bernsteint
Many entrants into the legal profession decided to become lawyers after
they were inspired by improvements in social conditions achieved by lawyers
like Abraham Lincoln and Thurgood Marshall or literary heroes like Atticus
Finch. The historical record of achievement recursively invites new genera-
tions into this occupation. Once these entrants arrive at law school, how-
ever, the sense of inspiration with which they began often fades, and an
inchoate pessimism, if not full-blown cynicism or depression, takes its place.
Critics of contemporary legal education who lament this descent into malaise
tend to see no cure for it. When they do offer afix, it looks uncannily like an
agenda they advocated in another context, repackaged as a tonic.
This Essay explores a better source of vigor and occupational skill
within legal education. Learning about the perils and defeats that their pro-
fession experiences would, paradoxically, increase the strengths of new law-
yers. In this context, forewarned really does mean forearmed. Informed
judgment about this profession includes knowing how and why lawyers lose
their licenses; why a lawyer pays out money for malpractice; what constitutes
a breach offiduciary duty; what level of work performance is incompetent or
ineffective under the Sixth Amendment; when to struggle against judges; why
a lawyer is disqualified from representing clients; and why lawyers forfeit
some of their freedoms of speech and association. A command of pitfalls
enables individual lawyers not only to defend themselves against the attacks
they might someday face but also to advance what is good for their clients
and the public. Only from a base of pitfalls-knowledge can lawyers master
their own profession.
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INTRODUCTION
Observers of American lawyers and the American legal curricu-
lum who agree on little else come together to find malaise in the legal
profession. While he served at the helm of an extraordinarily es-
teemed school, Anthony Kronman wrote a jeremiad that spoke of "a
crisis of morale."' This condition, Dean Kronman continued in The
Lost Lawyer, "is the product of growing doubts about the capacity of a
lawyer's life to offer fulfillment to the person who takes it up. Dis-
guised by the material well-being of lawyers, it is a spiritual crisis that
strikes at the heart of their professional pride."2
I ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
2 (3d prtg. 1995).
2 Id.
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This morose assessment, spoken from a locus of relative comfort
and ease, appears to be shared at varying levels of privilege within the
profession. Whether they choose to address demoralization, 3 depres-
sion, 4 dissatisfaction at work and in school, 5 alienation,6 cynicism,
7
heartlessness,8 or another pathology that lawyers and law students
manifest, commentators on this population are united in their
gloom.9 The empirically inclined among them gather data about law-
yers' unhappiness that suggest an intractable problem. 10
Most of the commentary proposes no solution for the problem,
and the cures that have been proposed say at least as much about the
prescriber as the disease. Decades ago, a psychiatrist on a law school
faculty diagnosed psychopathology in the profession and called for
attention to "the psychological dimension" of legal education." An
economist on another law faculty, who elsewhere denounced Ameri-
can Bar Association accreditation of law schools, has written that ac-
creditation is a culprit, noting that "the recent malaise"-in contrast,
3 See Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and
Fresh Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 113-14
(2002).
4 See JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, How LAwYERs LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFES-
SION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS 62-64 (2005) (discussing malaise, intellectual confusion,
and stifling of creative thought); Robert P. Schuwerk, The Law Professor as Fiduciary: What
Duties Do We Owe to Our Students, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 753, 764-65 (2004) (discussing clinical
depression).
5 See Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, the
Public, and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 219, 238-43 (2007); Adam Neufeld, Costs
of an Outdated Pedagogy? Study on Gender at Harvard Law School, 13 Am. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 511, 520 (2005).
6 See Bonita London et al., Psychological Theories of Educational Engagement: A Multi-
Method Approach to Studying Individual Engagement and Institutional Change, 60 VAND. L. REv.
455, 469-79 (2007) (reporting on a psychological study that found significant alienation in
the law school environment, particularly among minority students).
7 See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-
Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C.
L. REv. 411, 422 (2005). Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite
Law School, and the Moral Formation of the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705 passim (1998).
8 See Bridget A. Maloney, Distress Among the Legal Profession: What Law Schools Can Do
About It, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 307, 310-16 (2001) (reviewing psycho-
logical studies of law students' perceptions of coldness and hostility in their school
environment).
9 See Barton, supra note 7, at 414 (finding "at least four related but distinct crises
listed in these various accounts of the Job-like woes of the legal profession").
10 The most commonly cited summaries of these findings were written by Professors
Susan Daicoff and PatrickJ. Schlitz. Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Know Thyself A Review of Empiri-
cal Research on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1346-47
(1997); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Un-
healthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 873-80 (1999). But see Kathleen E.
Hull, Cross-Examining the Myth of Lawyers' Misery, 52 VAN . L. REV. 971 passim (1999) (re-
sponding to Schiltz); Robert Nelson, The AJD Project: The First National Longitudinal Study of
Lawyer Careers, 36 Sw. U. L. REv. 355, 361 (2007) (reporting on studies that found an unex-
pectedly high level of lawyer satisfaction).
11 Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 passim (1971).
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perhaps, to what had prevailed in lost Lincolnesque eras of appren-
ticeship-arose "during the same period that law school training be-
came dominant." 12 The venerable critic Duncan Kennedy rooted the
first of his many condemnations of legal education in the New Left
politics that went on to permeate much of his work. 13 Anthony Am-
sterdam, a lion of clinical legal education, sited the problem in the
lecture-and-take-notes classroom tradition. 14 More recently, feminists
trace much of the malaise to sexism, 15 while a critic of feminist legal
theory has written that feminist critiques of legal education obstruct
positive change. 16 Addressing lawyers' and law students' discontents,
the therapeuticjurisprudence scholar Marjorie Silver hopes for "affec-
tive assistance of counsel"; 17 provocateur Linda Hirshman recom-
mends pugnacity; 18 Paula Franzese revives her call for more
humanism. 19 Critical legal scholars and literary enthusiasts Jean
Stefancic and Richard Delgado blame legal formalism and the stifling
12 George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation
and Legal Education, 19 CARDozo L. REV. 2091, 2252 (1998); see also George B. Shepherd, No
African-American Lawyers Allowed: The Inefficient Racism of the ABA's Accreditation of Law
Schools, 53J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 104-08 (2003) (blaming ABA accreditation for preventing
African-Americans from entering the legal profession). William Shepherd, like George
Shepherd, is an economist.
13 See Duncan Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1 YALE REV. L. & Soc.
ACTION 71 (1970).
14 Amsterdam called the problem of declining student interest the MOPIE Syndrome,
an acronym for Maximum Obtainable Passivity In Education. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET
AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1019 (4th ed. 2005) (citation omitted).
15 See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAw SCHOOL, AND INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE 7-8 (1997) (reviewing reports of gender-specific responses to law school);
Sari Bashi & Maryana Iskander, Why Legal Education is Failing Women, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMI-
NISM 389, 391 (2006) ("Despite gender parity in enteringJ.D. classes, law schools are not
adequately preparing female law students for success, particularly in the upper ranks.");
Autumn Mesa, A Woman's Climb up the Law School Ladder, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 379, 389
(2003) (claiming that "feelings of low self-esteem, inferiority, self-doubt, alienation, depres-
sion, and anxiety that affect many of the women attending America's law schools should be
a signal that sexism continues to lurk in the law school halls and continues to preserve the
hierarchical structure that places women in the lower tiers").
16 See Dan Subotnik, The Cult of Hostile Gender Climate: A Male Voice Preaches Diversity to
the Choir, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 37, 40 (2001).
17 THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION
(Marjorie A. Silver ed., 2007).
18 LINDA HIRSHMAN, A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO LAw SCHOOL 273 (1999) (urging female
law students to demand more using a "Questionnaire for Deans"). On the author's pug-
nacity, see the contentiously received LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK: A MANIFESTO FOR
WOMEN OF THE WORLD (2006).
19 See Paula A. Franzese, To Be the Change: Finding Higher Ground in the Law, 50 ME. L.
REv. 11, 15 (1998); see also Paula A. Franzese, E Pluribus Unum-From Many, One: In Unity
There is Strength, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 1460, 1465 (1995) (excerpting a speech before the
NewJersey Ocean County Bar Association (May 1, 1995)) ("Let us embrace each other, so
that together we nurture strength of spirit and peace of mind.").
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of creativity, 20 while Paul Carrington, an opponent of critical legal
studies (CLS), blames those who support CLS.2 1
So much already having been said (and the sickness apparently
not going away in response), one might wonder what remains to be
written about, or recommended to repair, the blight on American le-
gal education and the legal profession. This Essay makes a few modest
claims to novelty. It starts by declaring a more limited agenda than
what preceding works have undertaken: I do not propose to locate or
comfort the Lost Lawyer, nor lead this profession back to whatever
bygone idyll other observers may recall. Writing from the legal acad-
emy, I propose a shift in training-the domain I know-that focuses
on law students but speaks occasionally to the continuing education of
licensed lawyers. I do not here reiterate an oft-stated view of any
topic, never having urged attention to pitfalls in any of my other writ-
ings. Indeed, "pitfalls" is not entirely my idea; it already pervades the
American legal curriculum and informs other analyses of how to tell
nascent lawyers about the responsibilities of their profession.
Like any other recommendation for the instruction of lawyers,
this "pitfalls" notion joins a sprawling pedagogical menu. Designers of
law school curricula have many choices, among them opportunities to
omit and abstain. Every American law school could, for instance, quit
teaching its fixtures like contracts, torts, property, criminal law, and
constitutional law without jeopardizing its accreditation. These seem-
ingly required courses are in fact electives as far as American Bar Asso-
ciation approval is concerned. Tradition, inertia, and prerogative
anchor them in place, rather than any rule.
Against this laissez-faire backdrop, one incongruous demand
sticks out: according to the accreditation standard, law students must
receive instruction in professional responsibility, or on "the history,
goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal profes-
sion and its members." 22 An "interpretation" in the ABA rules recom-
mends "instruction in matters such as the law of lawyering and the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar Associa-
tion."23 More improbable specificity-inside a standard otherwise in-
clined to tolerate almost anything, and the omission of anything, in
the curriculum.
20 STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 4, at 29-30.
21 Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 226-28 (1984).
22 2007-2008 STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, ch. 3, Standard 302(a) (5)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], available a! i-ttp://--w-w.abanet.org /egaled,/stnards,/20
072008StandardsWebContent/Chapter%203.pdf. The other apparently mandatory ele-
ment in the curriculum is legal writing, but the ABA remains vague about what exactly this
requirement means. See id. Standard 302(a) (3).
23 Id. interpretation 302-9.
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This Essay explores two questions that arise in reaction to the pro-
fessional responsibility mandate. It starts by undertaking an interpre-
tation, a quest for prescriptive content: what do accreditors want to
accomplish by requiring that all law students receive instruction about
the profession they will enter?24 A related question, assuming that law
schools share the accreditors' goal, seeks best practices in pedagogy:
which factual information about the legal profession should a law
school try to deliver?25
Engaging the first question, on the reason for the instructional
requirement, the Essay emphasizes preparation: American accreditors
have deemed information about the profession central to preparing
every student to practice law. 26 Unlike graduate schools that grant the
Ph.D.-a different kind of doctorate that reflects students' achieve-
ments and promise as researchers-law schools teach J.D. students
how to perform in an occupation. 27 Other material that does not ad-
dress preparation for practice is necessarily less fundamental to the
study of law. Elective courses remain optional for varying reasons.
Most electives pertain to the future work of only a fraction of students.
Some classes teach skills that can be taught equally well after gradua-
tion or learned on one's own. Some have value but are simply not
important enough to warrant mandatory status.
If preparation occupies the heart of legal education, then distin-
guishing curricular necessities from mere optional studies is helpful.
Preparation must occupy the heart of the only required course. An
answer to the second question follows: the law school curriculum
should strive to tell students what they need to know in order to enter
their profession well-prepared to practice law.28 This mandate calls
for instruction in a range of skills-among them analysis, writing, oral
advocacy, and the instrumental uses of precedent and quantitative
24 I echo the leading work that undertook to find reasons for an ABA mandate, writ-
ten during the transition from the Model Code to the Model Rules. Deborah L. Rhode,
Wy the ABA Bothers- A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. Rav. 689 passim
(1981).
25 Although I consider this question in the context of the required course on profes-
sional responsibility, much of what I describe or conclude also pertains to other law school
courses.
26 It may bear mentioning that to the extent that legal education prepares students
for practice, this preparation will vary from student to student, in response to individual
circumstances and career plans. The professional responsibility course is a suitable venue
to anticipate needs that pervade all, or most, categories of work for lawyers.
27 See James E. Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, and Professional Re-
sponsibility, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 71, 101 (1996) ("Legal education is, at the end of the
day, professional education.").
28 Jason Dolin argues, as does this Essay, that improvements in preparation-education
will improve satisfaction for students. Dolin, supra note 5, at 235-42. He focuses on en-
couraging legal educators to heed the recommendations of the 1992 MacCrate report. Id.
at 235.
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data-as they function in a context of policy and a pursuit of justice.
For the professional responsibility training that the ABA requires for
accreditation, the quest for preparation becomes more pointed: law
schools should teach their students about the dangers and opportuni-
ties that await them in this profession. 29 With this approach, instruc-
tors fulfill this mandate according to their own priorities, while
maintaining focus on three unifying themes: decision points for an
attorney;30 the positive law of lawyering; and viewing pitfalls as
opportunities.
Decision points for an attorney. A pitfalls pedagogy sees the individ-
ual lawyer, usually a person who represents clients or wishes to do so,
as the protagonist of the course. Students will typically take the role
of this person as they work through problems of professional responsi-
bility.31 Throughout the semester, our hero faces dilemmas where
neither alternative path suggests a pain-free way out. Even before the
dilemmas arise, she goes about the day's work with a slight sense of
foreboding. Abstractions take on a particularistic cast: not "What is
the optimal rule?" or "What would be the best outcome?" but "What,
specifically, would you do?" and "What [bad thing] could happen to
you in this situation?". Although the pedagogy starts with a measure
of sympathy for the lawyer, it does not hesitate to condemn the law-
yer's missteps.
The positive law of lawyering. In partial contrast to the more gen-
eral approach announced in the title of a leading casebook, Law and
Ethics of Lawyering,32 the positive law of lawyering makes a priority of
doctrine. Course materials consider regulation of the profession in
broad terms, looking not only at disciplinary law as written in "model"
terms by the ABA, but also criminal law, civil law, fiduciary rules, the
law of agency, and other sources of regulatory control over lawyers.33
29 See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 1-3 (4th ed. 2004) (observ-
ing that both the substantive law of lawyering and empirical information about the profes-
sion have mushroomed in recent decades, redeeming the course from its past irrelevance).
On teaching dangers and opportunities for lawyers, see generally Carol Rice Andrews,
Highway 101: Lessons in Legal Ethics that We Can Learn on the Road, 15 CEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS
75 passim (2001) (analogizing the study of professional responsibility to learning how to
comply with the law while driving).
30 Here I follow the convention that all attorneys are lawyers but not all lawyers are
attorneys: a lawyer is a person trained to give legal advice, whereas an attorney is a lawyer
who advocates for a client.
31 On the relation between role-taking and legal doctrine, see Anita Bernstein, How
Can a Product Be Liable?, 45 DuKE L.J. 1, 29-30 (1995).
32 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 14, at lxv.
33 The Restatement oJ the Law Governing Lawyers gives pride of place to pitfalls, installing
this warning in its Section One: "Upon admission to the bar of any jurisdiction, a person
becomes a lawyer and is subject to applicable law governing such matters as professional
discipline, procedure and evidence, civil remedies, and criminal sanctions." RESTATEMENr
(THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 (1998).
2009] 485
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Ethics is very much present in a pitfalls course, but it emerges from a
base of doctrine rather than from "what would you do if' hypotheti-
cals that ask students to choose between truth and partisanship in a
vacuum, without overt reference to rules or case law.
Viewing pitfalls as opportunities. Every occupational pitfall for one
lawyer can benefit another lawyer, and pitfalls also function to effect
ideals and social goods that extend beyond the interests of this profes-
sion. As detailed below, some pitfalls amount to privileges. The op-
portunities theme is always present in a pitfalls pedagogy. Instructors
can return to opportunities-the positive aspect of an accentuate-the-
negative pedagogy34-whenever class discussions wobble out of bal-
ance as too negative, too focused on individual lawyers, too cynical
sounding, or not cynical enough.
Whenever it omits pitfalls, the legal curriculum withholds crucial
facts, doctrines, policies, and philosophical insights from people who
have entrusted educators to prepare them for their vocation. The
prevailing promise that graduates will leave the campus positioned to
do well and do good-"you can make a lot of money," schools imply,
"and you can also follow in the footsteps of Abraham Lincoln or
Thurgood Marshall or Ruth Bader Ginsburg or Atticus Finch or your
favorite TV-procedural lawyer; it's your choice"-is not exactly false;
but it conveys only a rosy-side partial description of the profession that
does not by itself reassure or satisfy anyone who hears it. Knowing
about pitfalls ahead of time makes new lawyers more, not less, fulfilled
and secure when they begin their work.
I
FOREWARNED ABOUT WHAT?
Joining this profession opens new avenues of danger and oppor-
tunity that most students will learn about only fitfully before they grad-
uate from law school. Although the standard curriculum covers some
of these contingencies (and extracurricular experiences like summer
associateships and conversations with peers deliver relevant informal
information), classroom instruction about the legal profession is
uniquely well situated to bring together varied constituents to fore-
warning law students. Pitfalls for lawyers, as surveyed below, range
from the exalted to the mundane.
A. Threats
1. The Vulnerable License
Years (not to mention money) spent in pursuit of a law degree
trains the risk-averse mind on the prospect of losing one's privilege to
34 See infra Part II.
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work as a lawyer. For law students, the pitfall of becoming disbarred-
the most dramatic sanction that the bar imposes on its members-is
not obscure. The threat has a grand scope, suited to opera-sized
figures like the two lawyer-Presidents of the late twentieth century who
lost their licenses shortly after they left office.35 All the perceived
grandeur of this penalty notwithstanding, only a tiny fraction of law-
yers will ever face disbarment. Indeed, if one measures the need to
forewarn by the probability that a dangerous contingency will occur,
then instructors do not need to din their students in the risk of suffer-
ing professional sanctions generally. Researchers agree that sanction-
ing rates fall well below the level of sanction-worthy acts that lawyers
commit in the aggregate.3 6 On the relatively rare occasion that an
errant lawyer receives some form of professional discipline, that form
is likely to be the gentlest arrow in the quiver: the admonition or pri-
vate reprimand.
The pedagogical need to forewarn is, however, not measured ade-
quately by the probability that a particular contingency will happen.
Knowing that they could be disbarred does not make law students
aware enough of the vulnerability of their license to practice. The
authority of licensure casts a shadow wider than the range of sanctions
that disciplinarians in fact impose. New lawyers should learn about
the breadth of the professional shadow before they graduate and take
up their careers under it.
What can the licensors do to you when you become a lawyer? Entry to
the profession makes a natural starting point. After candidates gradu-
ate from law school, perform well enough on written exams, and ap-
ply for membership, bar authorities inquire into their moral character
and fitness to practice law. Interviews, credit checks, criminal back-
ground checks, recitations of past brushes with the law, investigations
into the reasons for having declared bankruptcy, and other proxies
for rectitude become available to support a past-is-prologue, static
character determination about moral status.37
35 See Todd v. Ligon, 148 S.W.3d 229, 232 (Ark. 2004) (noting the five-year suspension
of former President Clinton from the Arkansas bar); In re Nixon, 385 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307
(N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (ordering disbarment of the former President). When his Arkansas
suspension expired in January 2006, President Clinton took no steps to be reinstated, ei-
ther in Arkansas or at the Supreme Court Bar. Andrew Glass, GonzalesJoins List of Conflicted
Predecessors, POLITICo, Aug. 28, 2007, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0807/5540.
html.
36 Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1, 1 (2007) (noting that state disciplinary agencies formally sanction only about 5,600 law-
yers per year, despite receiving more than 125,000 lawyer discipline complaints per year).
37 See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE
LJ. 491 (1985) (describing and offering a reconsideration of the bar's moral character
requirement).
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Unfair or hypocritical as such scrutiny of the postulant class may
be,38 it does provide initiation into a regime of control where regula-
tors can impose a range of conditions that would look like imperti-
nences outside the professional monopoly. A bar regulator might
conclude that a lawyer needs treatment for alcoholism, training on
how to keep better financial records, restrictions on his or her prac-
tice, more continuing legal education, or any other intervention "that
the state's highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with
the purpose of lawyer sanctions. '39 This purpose is to protect "clients,
the public, the legal system, and the legal profession. ' 40 Any lawyer
inclined to feel offended by such ministrations should bear in mind
that full-blown sanctions would feel worse. In a comment about the
tradeoff, the California Bar observes that a lawyer offered an "agree-
ment in lieu of discipline" may be forced "to fulfill nearly any type of
remedial condition deemed appropriate for his or her case rather
than face an investigation and prosecution." 4
1
The swath of control gets wider because of regulators' habitual
demands of full disclosure about a lawyer's past. Even the gentle pri-
vate reprimand forces a lawyer to answer 'Yes" on all subsequent docu-
ments that ask officially whether the lawyer ever experienced
professional discipline. Regulators can treat lack of candor as a worse
offense than the offense omitted from an application or declaration:
expunged criminal convictions or misdemeanor convictions in juve-
nile court do not blot a copybook much, but lawyers who have omitted
these histories from applications to practice law have been sanctioned
for this omission. 42
Another way to see the power of disciplinary law is from the per-
spective of client protection. Discipline complements the economic
clout that some clients hold and that students who intend to practice
in firms may take for granted. 43 Clients who pay their lawyers high
fees hold strength from the simple fact that they can walk away, pull-
ing their money with them. This economic leverage gives rich clients
38 The claim of unfairness is that the bar looks closely at new applicants while turning
a blind-or at most an indulgent-eye to much misconduct that established lawyers com-
mit. See id. at 546-50.
39 ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 2.8(g) (1986).
40 Id. Standard 1.1.
41 The State Bar of California, Priorities and Prevention, http://calbar.ca.gov/state/
calbar/calbar generic.jsp?cid=10136&id=1647 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
42 See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass'n v. Guidugli, 967 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Ky. 1998) (suspending an
admitted attorney practicing law for 30 days for failure to disclose a material fact on his bar
application); Layon v. N.D. State Bar Bd., 458 N.W.2d 501, 512 (N.D. 1990) (denying ad-
mission to the North Dakota bar).
43 Seegenerally Symposium, What Do Clients Want?, 52 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2003) (address-
ing neglect, failure to communicate, and failure to represent clients diligently, the discipli-
nary offenses that dominate enforcement even though rich clients, who presumably have
good access to bar authorities, almost never bring complaints about them).
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the protections and prerogatives in practice that disciplinary law as-
signs to all clients in principle. Because well-heeled individuals and
entities seldom need to resort to Bar authorities to get what they think
is coming to them, "[d] isciplinary proceedings against lawyers in large
and even medium-sized firms are very rare. '44
Focusing on the vulnerable license reminds new lawyers about
their vulnerability before and after they join these large- or medium-
sized shelters from discipline. From a pitfalls perspective, the bar gov-
erns private-sector lawyers interstitially, fitting itself into spaces the ec-
onomic power of wealthy clients does not reach. Scrutiny of
applicants has ensured a ritual of examination and submission for
every newcomer. Over the next several years, young lawyers in this
scrutinized cohort will respond to discipline more from the market
than the bar.45 Those who give offense in a way that an economic
weapon cannot redress-that is, termination of their employment or a
threat of that penalty-may find themselves in its sights. The sanc-
tions apparatus gives pitfalls-power to affronted third parties; ag-
grieved clients with more spunk than money; enforcers of public law
who are willing to report violations incidentally; and other initiators
who are not situated to control errant lawyers by threatening to with-
draw their business.
As positive law, then, disciplinary rules unite the legal profession
under universal conditions of danger and opportunity. Economically
privileged lawyers learn that non-enforcement, or at most under-en-
forcement, characterizes almost every rule on the books46-or, as
David Wilkins has put the point, regulators interpret disciplinary rules
to "mirror the norms of the marketplace."47 Lawyers outside the
reach of client-controlled market power will experience their danger
in disciplinary law. This message, which emerges by degrees in a pit-
falls pedagogy and which may sound cynical at first to students, actu-
ally affirms a progressive ideal: the lawyer's license is vulnerable
because the bar will listen to complaints and sometimes take action in
response. Laypersons who lack material wealth can have power over
lawyers.
44 Elizabeth Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 817, 820 n.17 (2000). A leading casebook notes the epiphenomenon of "private disci-
pline," where large law firms impose sanction-like suspensions on their associates for rela-
tively minor infractions. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHICS 838 (6th ed. 2002).
45 Discipline is especially rare during the first ten years of admission to the bar. HAZ-
ARD ET AL., supra note 14, at 1148 (reporting a study that indicated 82 percent of disci-
plined lawyers had been in practice more than eleven years).
46 See Chambliss, supra note 44, at 819-20.
47 David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 799, 867 (1992).
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2. Civil Liability
Civil liability is a pitfall of underreported dimensions within the
profession generally, not just in legal education. One major segment
of civil liability, actions by clients and third parties for legal malprac-
tice, remains especially unseen. "Legal malpractice is a taboo subject,"
began one law review article. 48 "It has been ignored by the legal pro-
fession, law schools, mandatory continuing legal education (CLE)
programs, and even by scholarly and lay publications,' 49 even though
the profession has experienced "an unprecedented growth in legal
malpractice claims and lawsuits. '50  Ignoring legal malpractice in
these forums continued after this 1994 publication, a period that saw
yet another spike in the rate of claims against insured lawyers.
51
Students who proceed through law school and then graduate
without learning anything about legal malpractice may presume that
others will shield them from their own ignorance. A minority of
them-law clerks, government lawyers, public defenders-are indeed
almost perfectly safe from malpractice liability based on the jobs they
have chosen. 52 Those who go to work in larger firms might count on
the practice of overstaffing to keep them at the bottom of a hierarchy,
giving them little chance to breach their duty to anyone until they
learn the liability ropes. They might also assume that the experienced
managers who run their offices install safeguards against inadvertent
malpractice. For those lawyers who serve lower-income clients, a feel-
ing of shelter from malpractice claims might come from the lack of
money and privilege in the office: less money and less prestige means
less to lose. Lawyers not long out of school, regardless of the kind of
work they undertake, might think of themselves as not worth suing
because they are too saddled by debt; or new lawyers might feel sure
that malpractice insurers will know which behaviors or practices to
48 Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 1657, 1658 (1994).
49 Id. at 1658-59 (internal citations omitted).
50 Id. at 1661.
51 See GILLERS, supra note 44, at 766 (describing an increase in claims against lawyers,
from 22,838 claims in 1990-95 to 35,678 in 1996-99).
52 Some states explicitly immunize public defenders from malpractice liability. See
Amanda Myra Hornung, Note, The Paper Tiger of Gideon v. Wainwright and the Evisceration
of the Right to Appointment of Legal Counsel for Indigent Defendants, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'V &
ETHIcSJ. 495, 531-33 (2005). On the futility of bringing malpractice actions against crimi-
nal defense lawyers, see, for example, Wiley v. County of San Diego, 966 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal.
1998) (imposing a requirement that the defendant prove innocence to establish malprac-
tice); Peeler v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. 1995) (rejecting a malpractice
claim after a lawyer failed to relay an offer of transactional immunity that would have
avoided the plaintiff's criminal conviction).
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recommend to them as part of a business plan to keep their payouts
down.53
These comforting beliefs do contain some truth, but the peril of
civil liability for malpractice remains, especially in the longer term. A
pitfalls-sensitive pedagogy for legal malpractice would provide a vari-
ety of warnings. Foremost, it could tell students that the set of individ-
uals and entities that can bring actions against them is not limited to
what they regard as the roster of their own retained clients. Liability
to a third-party non-client has been a fixture of malpractice law for
decades. A related pitfall of civil liability emerges from agency law
and fiduciary principles, which for some students will come up in no
other classroom venue. The agency or fiduciary pitfall is the occa-
sional obligation to rank another's interests ahead of one's own or to
proceed without seeking gain for oneself or a third party. "Permitting
an agent's focus to encompass additional incentives," as the Restate-
ment of Agency puts the point, "is inconsistent with the singleness of
focus due the principal." 54 Despite typically having studied contract
law, students can take up their practices without having encountered
case law imposing fiduciary-duty liability on actors who intended no
harm,55 breached no overt agreement,56 or caused no harm to any
victim. 57
3. Criminal and Regulatory Liability
Federal courts have upheld convictions for an array of crimes that
lawyers committed while representing clients, including obstruction
ofjustice, false swearing, pejury, suborning perjury, aiding and abet-
ting, securities fraud, and mail fraud. Similar pitfalls for lawyers ap-
pear in state criminal law. 58 The pitfalls grow larger in those
53 Presumably informed by experience, one provider of legal malpractice insurance
wrote a primer to ease this population out of complacency. See Douglas R. Richmond,
Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2006).
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b, illus. 2 (2005).
55 See Klemme v. Best, 941 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (holding that a
lawyer can be liable for breach of fiduciary duty without proof of unlawful intent).
56 See Estate of Keatinge v. Biddle, 316 F.3d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that under
Maine law, an attorney-client relationship can exist despite an attorney's denial of the
relationship).
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs § 55 cmt. d (1998)
("[I]f a lawyer mistakenly deposits a client's money in[to] the lawyer's own bank account
and proceeds to invest it and make a profit, the client is entitled to restitution of the
original sum and the profits from its investment.") (citations omitted).
58 See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 14, at 26-46 (reviewing cases that upheld prosecu-
tions of attorneys under both federal and state criminal law); see also STEPHEN GILLERS &
Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAwYERs: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 651-83 (2008) (titling a
chapter "Federal Provisions on Conflicts, Confidentiality, and Crimes").
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jurisdictions where conviction of a felony triggers automatic
disbarment.59
In a pitfalls pedagogy, obstruction of justice warrants particular
attention because of the unique vulnerabilities inherent in the prac-
tice of criminal defense law. Lawyers, like non-lawyers, ordinarily stay
clear of criminal prosecution by heeding their own inclinations to
honesty and prudence. For a criminal defense lawyer, however, this
law is relatively hard to obey. To start, "obstruction of justice" is
vague. Vaguely worded criminal statutes jeopardize anyone the state
may want to prosecute for their violation, but obstruction of justice
menaces criminal defense lawyers in particular because thwarting the
prosecutorial apparatus-or standing against 'justice," as the word ap-
pears in the name of this crime-is part of their job; the crime em-
powers prosecutors as enforcers of law against them.60 Eschewing
criminal-defense work shelters a lawyer from this danger only to the
extent that her clients, or the lawyer herself, can avoid interacting
with criminal prosecutors.
Another set of pitfalls for the unwary presents itself in the author-
ity of federal agencies to regulate and discipline lawyers who practice
before them. Just as obstruction of justice imposes little danger on
the majority of lawyers (and imperils mainly the minority who practice
criminal defense), agency authority is not a threat for most practition-
ers. Specialists who practice before the Internal Revenue Service or
the Patent and Trademark Office know where they stand with those
agencies; for pedagogy, a chief hidden peril of regulatory authority
lurks in federal securities law. An attorney's work can constitute prac-
tice before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whether
the lawyer knows it or not.61 As entities, law firms are vulnerable to
SEC-initiated civil and criminal sanctions if they employ individuals
who violate fraud and insider-trading laws.6 2
4. Being Deemed Incompetent or to Have Given a Defendant Less
than Effective Assistance of Counsel
Both the Constitution and state-level disciplinary rules declare
that work that lawyers do for their clients can be so bad as to amount
59 See Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-41 (West 2004); N.Y. JUD. LAw § 90.4.a (McKinney
2002); see also Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (interpreting
D.C. law to make disbarment following a felony conviction mandatory).
60 See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327,
328-29 (1998).
61 See Roberta S. Karmel, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., Panel Discussion: The
Evolution of Corporate Governance (Nov. 22, 2002), in Symposium, The Evolving Legal and
Ethical Role of the Corporate Attorney After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 52 A. U. L. REv. 613,
634 (2003).
62 Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms? 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 44 n.271
(1991).
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to a public disgrace. A defendant convicted of a crime following inef-
fective assistance of counsel may be entitled to a new trial or the with-
drawal of an ill-advised guilty plea.63  Lack of competence is a
disciplinary offense in the Model Rules, 64 and the ABA recommends
the disbarment of any lawyer vhose "course of conduct demonstrates
that the lawyer does not understand the most fundamental legal doc-
trines or procedures" if this lawyer's conduct injures a client.65
Some observers call the risk of disgrace for incompetent or inef-
fective work not half-strong enough. In its leading ineffective assis-
tance decision, Strickland v. Washington,66 the Supreme Court
construed the right to counsel indulgently in protection of the profes-
sion; subsequent courts have deemed an array of egregious behaviors
and lapses not bad enough to reverse a conviction under the Strickland
standard. 67 As for incompetence, bar authorities almost never sanc-
tion a lawyer for it;68 actions for malpractice serve as almost the sole
source of external review of attorney competence. 69
This lax response noted, incompetence and ineffective assistance
of counsel do present a pitfall-not the danger that any individual
lawyer will suffer disgrace, which is slight, but the pitfall of feeble pro-
fessional standards. New lawyers ought to know that a habeas claim
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel will probably fail; that courts
generally do not hear claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal,
63 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538 (2003) (invalidating a capital convic-
tion on the ground of ineffective assistance at trial); Rollins v. State, 591 S.E.2d 796,
799-800 (Ga. 2004) (permitting petitioner to withdraw the guilty plea that she had chosen
to make after receiving ineffective assistance).
64 Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., To What Extent Can a Disciplinary Code Assure the Competence of
Lawyers?, 61 TEMP. L. REV. 1211, 1220 (1988) (noting that the rule on competence is Rule
1.1, "the place of honor").
65 ABA STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS, Standard 4.5.1 (1991).
66 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
67 E.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 777-78 (1987) (holding that a lawyer's lack of
investigation into mitigating evidence for a capital sentencing hearing did not violate the
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights); Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (condoning the "assistance" of a lawyer who slept during a trial; the defen-
dant ultimately received a death sentence); Smith v. Ylst, 826 F.2d 872, 873-74 (9th Cir.
1987) (denying an ineffective-assistance claim on the ground that the defendant failed to
show any prejudicial effect of his lawyer's having experienced a documented "paranoid
psychotic reaction" during his trial).
68 See Susan R. Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEO.
L.J. 705 passim (1981) (surveying pre-Model Rules disciplinary case law).
69 See id. at 732 ("Perhaps because of the void in self-regulation, market sanctions in
the form of malpractice suits have become the primary method by which standards of care
are defined.") (citation omitted); see also GILLERS, supra note 44, at 743-45 (noting that
lawyers are seldom disciplined for their lapses of competence). Lawyers who represent
defendants in capital cases "are virtually guaranteed" an accusation of ineffective assistance
at some point, see David M. Siegel, My Reputation or Your Liberty (or Your Life): The Ethical
Obligations of Criminal Defense Counsel in Postconviction Proceedings, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 85,
90-91 (1999), but for purposes of this Essay, "virtual[ ]" guarantees are not considered
pitfalls.
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only collaterally, which forces a defendant to spend years exhausting
the appellate route before being heard;70 that whether a lawyer suffers
adverse consequences after injuring a client through incompetent
work will depend largely on whether a client sues for malpractice; and
that this profession produces, shares, and acts on very little publicly
available information about whether a particular lawyer possesses min-
imal competence. 71 The law school climate of ongoing competition
and evaluation can lull students into believing that because lawyers
are perpetually judged and found wanting, the truly ineffective or in-
competent among them will be eliminated from the profession or at
least disabled from doing them harm. (Slackers know better, but
most law students are not slackers.)
B. Tangling With Judges
The Langdellian emphasis on what judges decide still pervades
American legal education and will likely remain a central theme, even
if reformers who want the curriculum to emphasize something else-
drafting, business planning, transactions, negotiation, alternative dis-
pute resolution, the deployment and understanding of statutes, or ex-
trinsic subjects like economics-continue to expand their influence.
Law students seldom graduate without hearing about "what the judge
had for breakfast"; how a judge hews to (or strays from) precedent;
the path of case law on particular topics; the interplay of statutes and
the common law; rules of forensics (in courses on evidence and civil
procedure); and a few famous Supreme Court decisions. The apex of
this profession is a supreme court, and providers outside the profes-
sional monopoly of bar-approved lawyers, no matter how liberally in-
dulged when they try to give clients advice about law and business,
must always keep a respectful distance from at least one lawyerly func-
tion: they may not appear in court on behalf of clients. 72
As instruction for lawyers who will practice before judges, this hi-
erarchical-institutional view of the courts does not mention the role of
the judge as antagonist. Both the judge's power and the lack thereof
can get in a lawyer's way.73 A litigator might manipulate her. When it
robes the judge in detachment, if not pure neutrality, a pedagogy
70 See Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REv. 679, 680 (2007).
71 Levin, supra note 36, at 21-22.
72 HAZARD ET AL., supra note 14, at 910 (surveying the debates on what constitutes
unauthorized practice, which swirl around one uncontroversial, centuries-old tenet: "that a
nonlawyer could not appear in court to represent another person").
73 Judges hold other kinds of power over the legal profession, notably through their
prerogative to adopt rules of professional responsibility. This section addresses potential
clashes between a lawyer and judge in the courtroom.
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without pitfalls leaves students who will deal with this person
unprepared.
1. A Panoply of Sanctions
The prerogative to give lawyers orders covers more ground than
what emerges with reference to statutes and rules because trial judges
hold the inherent power to do much of whatever they see fit to con-
trol their courtrooms and dockets. 7 4 They can fine or incarcerate a
lawyer they deem to be in contempt of court. They can sanction law-
yers for frivolous pleadings per Rule 11 or its state-law counterparts.
Several judges have refused to follow statutes and administrative rules
written to authorize non-lawyers to do certain work, contending that
judges hold inherent power to determine what constitutes the prac-
tice of law.75 Judges enjoy considerable authority to interfere with the
payment of attorneys' fees-some derived from statutes, such as provi-
sions for fee shifting in civil rights cases, and some from (once more,
with feeling) their inherent powers. 76 A leading treatise notes that
judges will sometimes declare, even "without the complaint of any
party," that attorneys' fees are too high and must be reduced or
refunded.7 7
2. Disqualification (by)
The prerogative to disqualify a lawyer from representing a partic-
ular client, typically because of the lawyer's conflicts of interest, like-
wise derives from the judge's inherent power. This power means that
litigators who invest time and money in a case risk being removed by
court order at a point when they cannot recoup their investment. Dis-
qualification motions made in federal court have skyrocketed in re-
cent years, on both the civil and criminal sides of the docket. 78
Commentators attribute this growth in part to an increase in real risks
of conflicts-law firms fell into the habit of merging; client businesses
started to spread their work among multiple law firms; and complex
litigation involving corporations expanded-and also to the rise of
74 The Supreme Court first recognized this power in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370
U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962). The Restatement remarks that judges have used inherent powers
to assert "extravagantly broad" authority over lawyers. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1, Reporter's Note on cmt. c (1998).
75 GILLERS, supra note 44, at 759 (summarizing cases).
76 See, e.g., In re Goldstein, 430 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 2005) (approving fee reduc-
tion); Guralnick v. Supreme Court of N.J., 747 F. Supp. 1109, 1118 (D.N.J. 1990) (approv-
ing mandatory fee arbitration rules promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court).
77 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 496 (1986).
78 See Leah Epstein, Comment, A Balanced Approach to Mandamus Review of Attorney
Disqualification Orders, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 667, 667 & n.3 (2005).
20091
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
new law that denies interlocutory review of disqualification under the
collateral order doctrine.
79
Compounding this uncertainty, judges hold divergent views on
key points regarding conflicts. At the trial level, some judges seek to
enforce the ban on conflicts present in disciplinary law, while others
would leave thatjob to bar authorities, disqualifying lawyers only when
the conflict-tainted representation causes harm to the party.80 At the
appellate level, courts disagree about how much interlocutory relief to
give conflicts-disqualified lawyers:81 some courts will view a disqualifi-
cation motion as, presumptively, a mean and costly trick; others are
willing to engage lawyers' adversaries in the fight against representa-
tions tainted by conflicts. High stakes and murky doctrine combine to
make disqualification a pitfall for litigators.
3. Disqualification (o])
Conflicts of interest can disqualify judges as well as lawyers. Judi-
cial disqualification is a sword with several edges for litigators. The
judge's conflict might be harmful, harmless, or inconsequential to the
client's interest. Attempting to disqualify one's assigned judge could
help a client in some cases and cause harm to her in others. For a
lawyer, informal norms around the courthouse about what constitutes
a conflict of interest for a judge and what to do about it likely matter
at least as much as phrases in a state code of judicial conduct or the
federal disqualification statutes.8 2
Experience and observation will teach this particular pitfall better
than a classroom exercise, but the pedagogy that this Essay advocates
would include strategy in any classroom discussion ofjudicial disquali-
fication. The blackletter in 28 U.S.C. § 455, for example, takes on
force when read for its provocation to judges. An instructor could
broach the topic through role-playing. How would you as a judge re-
act if a lawyer appearing in your court said that you had a conflict of
the kinds enumerated in § 455(b) (4)?83 If you as a litigator were re-
79 See id. at 673-78 (summarizing case law and commentary).
80 For an endorsement of the abstemious latter path that pays due heed to arguments
favoring the former, see Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 71, 84-98 (1996).
81 Epstein, supra note 78, at 669-70.
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006) (providing disqualification rules for federal judges);
MODEL CODE OFJuDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007) (providing model rules on disqualifica-
tion of state judges). For an extended argument that this informality and ad hoc decision
making needs repair in the form of more determinate procedural reforms, see Amanda
Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L.
REv. 531 (2005).
83 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (requiringjudicial recusal if, among other things, the judge
has a personal bias or if the judge worked on the matter in private or government
practice).
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questing judicial recusal because of a conflict, how would you present
your initiative? If the judge were to ask you and your client to waive
the conflict, what would you want to know? Do you see strategic perils
or opportunities in the judicial disqualification rules?
C. Abridged Political and Civil Rights for Attorneys
Entry into this profession can curb an individual's freedoms and
prerogatives: lawyers impose silence on themselves in numerous rules
and norms. The ones most frequently associated with the First
Amendment address advertising and solicitation of new business.
Lawyers, who compete for work in a market economy, cannot pursue
what might be called new business without restraint.8 4 Bar authorities
forbade lawyer advertising until the Supreme Court struck down this
prohibition as part of its expansion of commercial-speech rights;85 still
apparently put off by lawyers' touting themselves to the public, these
regulators continue to constrain the practice. 86 Caselaw holds lawyers
to stern standards of accuracy and technical compliance when they
advertise,8 7 and a few states that do not screen other types of advertis-
ing compel lawyers to turn in proposed ad copy for clearance by regu-
lators.88 Most jurisdictions maintain the Model Rules ban on direct
in-person solicitation of new clients, although they do not enforce it
much89 and liberalize it with several permissive exceptions.90 Rules
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR 7.1-7.3 (2007).
85 See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379-82 (1977). The commercial speech
era began with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virgina Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
86 See William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising: Public
Images and the Irresistible Aristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325, 327-28 (1996)
(describing increases in scrutiny and skepticism toward advertising from bar authorities in
the wake of liberalization from the Supreme Court).
87 See, e.g., Haymond v. Lundy, No. CIV. A. 99-5048, 2001 WL 15956, at *2-5 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 5, 2001) (applying the Lanham Act to lawyers' advertising); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics &
Conduct v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Iowa 1985) (approving detailed restrictions
for broadcast advertisements); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Shane, 692 N.E.2d 571,
573-74 (Ohio 1998) (per curiam) (reprimanding lawyers for an advertisement because it
did not tell potential clients that clients are technically responsible for the costs of
litigation).
88 See, e.g., FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-7.7 (2007) (requiring filing advertise-
ment with the Florida Bar no later than the first dissemination); Miss. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 7.5(a) (2007) (requiring submission of proposed advertisements to the Office
of the General Counsel of the Mississippi Bar).
89 I elaborate in Sanctioning the Ambulance Chaser, 41 Lov. L.A. L. REv. (forthcoming
2008).
90 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2007) (permitting solicitation of a
new prospective client when the person solicited is a lawyer or a person who has a prior
relationship with the lawyer, unless the lawyer's "significant motive" for the solicitation is
his or her own pecuniary gain).
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also limit what a lawyer can say in public about a case before it comes
to trial,9 1 and while campaigning to be elected to a judicial office. 92
Speech-related rules that have escaped First Amendment scrutiny
may be seen in pitfalls terms. Take confidentiality: rules in every juris-
diction order lawyers to keep silent about at least some confidential
information pertaining to their clients. These restraints on speech
give way to some telling exceptions. The Model Rules, for example,
include a broad exception for self-protection; a lawyer may reveal cli-
ent confidences if revelation would establish a claim or defense for
the lawyer or in response to allegations about the lawyer's representa-
tion of a client. 93 The interests of innocent third parties in disclosure
do not rank as high in the Rules.94 In this slightly sinister light, the
silence esteemed so highly in various bans might look more haughty,
distant, and self-insulating than dignified. The pitfall of professionally
suppressed speech here is for clients, third parties, and the public.
At the same time, the rule about suppressing confidential infor-
mation endangers lawyers too. Whenever the information in question
relates to dangers that threaten third parties, neither silence nor reve-
lation will necessarily keep an advocate out of trouble. Since the pas-
sage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, lawyers and businesses have
struggled-and spent millions of dollars-trying to find a middle path
whereby lawyers can honor confidentiality rules, the organized bar's
ideal, while at the same time not withhold disclosure, which securities
regulators want from them.95
In this context, my assertion that a few curbs amount to
"abridged political and civil rights" becomes less hyperbolic. This oc-
cupation admittedly enjoys many privileges in the United States-
among them wage income above the median-and near-control of
many branches of government. Lawyers as a group are not oppressed
or silenced. The pitfall to share with students is not a story of their
own victimization-to-come but rather a device to think about political
and civil rights generally.
91 See id. R. 3.6. The First Amendment-based revisions to this rule derive from Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
92 MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (2008).
93 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5).
94 For example, under the Model Rules, a lawyer who knows that misconduct by her
client threatens a third party with financial ruin may not reveal the misconduct unless the
client used the lawyer's services to further it. Id. R. 1.6(b)(3). By contrast, when lawyers
assert or defend their own interests, they can reveal all the confidential information they
want, limited only by the thin proviso that they confine revelation to what they "reasonably
believes [is] necessary" to assert or defend these interests. Id. R. 1.6(b) (5). For a critique
of this inconsistent stance toward client secrets and confidences, see Henry D. Levine, Self-
Interest or Self-Defense: Lawyer Disregard of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Profit and Protection, 5
HoFsTrA L. REv. 783, 785-86 (1977).
95 For an overview of this battleground, see Robert N. Rapp, Sarbanes-Oxley and SEC
Standards of Professional Conduct, 57 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 365, 367-68 (2007).
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Examining the ways in which freedom of speech or freedom of
association grants lawyers fewer safeguards from government control
than what their fellow citizens enjoy becomes, in this pitfalls
pedagogy, a challenge to under-questioned dogma. Perhaps these en-
titlements are less wonderful or meaningful than their exalters say, if
the profession that writes and enforces them does not fully want them
for itself. Alternatively-and also more heretically, inside the rights-
enthusiastic culture of a law school-lawyers might be enjoying these
entitlements at the right level, and non-lawyers might have too much
of them. Discussing the reasons that lawyers cannot speak (and associ-
ate) 96 as freely as non-lawyers conveys what these rights mean.
II
ACCENTUATING THE NEGATIVE
Johnny Mercer's wartime advice to the contrary, legal educators
should not allow curricula to "eliminate the negative, ' 9 7 "the negative"
being contingencies summarized in the last Part, at least some of
which lie ahead of everyone who will practice law. Not, of course, that
anybody has eliminated "the negative," in the sense of the ambient
misery that pervades legal education. As we have already noted, the
coffers of gloom at any law school are probably flush long before any
pitfalls pedagogy arrives. 98 Law students suffer from depression at a
higher rate than the general population and researchers attribute
some of their symptoms of distress to their law school experience
rather than their preexisting mental state.9 9 Anxiety-an effect of the
perpetual rank-and-sort apparatus augmented by job searches, loan
repayment prospects, a sense of foreclosed opportunities-is rife in-
side law schools. 100 Students often perceive employers as categorically
disdaining the bottom half, or even the bottom nine-tenths, of their
ranked class.
The pitfalls pedagogy seizes this ambient negativity and turns it
into strength. The dangers recited in Part I are not quite news to
students, who vaguely know that their licenses are vulnerable, judges
96 See, e.g., Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 19 M.D.L.R. 39, 1997 Mass. Comm. Discrim.
LEXIS 12, at *16-17 (Mass. Comm. Discrim. Feb. 25, 1997) (sanctioning a lawyer for at-
tempting to maintain a women-only client base for her matrimonial practice); MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from having sex with a client
unless a consensual sexual relationship preceded the representation).
97 Mercer wrote the lyrics and Harold Arlen the music for the Academy
Award-nominated "Ac-Cent-Tchu-Ate the Positive." See Richard Harrington, Still Another
Indictment of Bad Frankie, CHI. SuN-TIMES, June 5, 2005, at 5, LexisNexis Academic (com-
wending, s ESay, the---------C
ub rb y, u lt: JIJUNC U1 Lo1 alUlVL .
98 See supra notes 1-19 and accompanying text.
99 Neufeld, supra note 5, at 552 & n.123.
100 Ruth Ann McKinney, Depression and Anxiety in Law Students: Are We Part of the Problem
and Can We Be Part of the Solution?, 8J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 229, 229-30 (2002).
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can hurt them, legal malpractice exists, and so on. Law schools can-
not conceal the general danger of professional unpleasantness ahead.
Candor, however, about these facts of occupational life constitutes
forewarning. Both by their temperament and the design of the larger
curriculum, law students are well positioned to become forearmed
when forewarned.
A. Risk Aversion
As both curricular prescription and a fact on the ground, risk
aversion pervades the legal academy. The conventional wisdom that
law students are risk averse' 0 1 may be hard to verify' 0 2 but appears
sound: as an occupation, law delivers relatively certain payoffs (status,
expected income, the approval of one's family) while withholding the
higher, though less likely, gains available in other endeavors (business
enterprises, the creation of art). One perceived value of a law degree
is that it bestows and maintains open options for its holder. 10 3
Law schools teach risk aversion to a population inclined in that
direction to a degree that goes beyond student temperaments. Paul
Brest and Linda Krieger link risk aversion to an unhealthy conserva-
tism built into legal education and the practice of law. Lawyers and
legal educators
are viewed-perhaps by ourselves as well as by others-as conserva-
tive, risk-averse, precedent-bound, and wedded to a narrow, legalis-
tic range of problem solving strategies. There may be substance to
this view. The appellate case method and adversarial legal processes
101 For guarded endorsements of this proposition, see Richard L. Hasen, The Efficient
Duty to Rescue, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 144, 149 n.12 (1995); Jonathan R. Macey,
Lawyers in Agencies: Economics, Social Psychology, and Process, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109,
110-11 (1998).
102 A 1990 study found that in all graduate fields of study except law, optimists perform
better than pessimists. Richard G. Uday, That Frayed Rope, 16 UTAH B. J. 8, 9 (2003). One
commentator supports the risk-averse construct with evidence that the profession has his-
torically resisted technological innovation, notably the telephone at the end of the nine-
teenth century. CatherineJ. Lanctot, Regulating Legal Advice in Cyberspace, 16 ST. JOHN'SJ.
LEGAL COMMENT. 569, 570 (2002). For a law professor's skepticism about the utility of risk
utility as a concept, see Victor Goldberg, Columbia Sch. of Law, Risk Management Round
Table: Aversion to Risk Aversion (Apr. 12-13, 2002), http://www.ldeo.columbia.edu/
chrr/documents/meetings/roundtable/pdf/notes/goldberg._vicnote.pdf.
103 See Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal Education in
a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REv. 515, 534 (2007) (lamenting that the
authors' innovations demand "a level of intellectual and professional curiosity that is not
cultivated by the current default (and often conformist) cultural stance of detached mas-
tery, a stance that both distances students from the object of their learning and leads them
to keep their options forever open"). On the lure of open options, see John Tierney, The
Advantages of Closing a Few Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2008, at Fl.
[Vol. 94:479
PITFALLS AHEAD
in general train lawyers to be more adept at criticizing ideas than at
creating them. 10 4
Brest and Krieger have a gloomy view of what they see, analogiz-
ing lawyers to the farmer who finds a flat tire on his car while on a
deserted road near a barn and, hoping to repair it but not having a
jack with him, starts a long walk to town, "failing to notice that the
barn's hay lift pulley is positioned to lift up the car. His error was in
framing the problem too narrowly. He confused the problem ('How
can I lift my car?') with one particular solution ('Find a jack!')." 105
Such confusion is not unique to lawyers-Brest and Krieger also attri-
bute it to clients and "people"1 06 generally-but the authors believe
that occupational resistance to creativity and fresh thinking would di-
minish if law school curricula were to relax about precedent, stare
decisis, and hewing to a "narrow, legalistic" approach to client
problems. The Brest and Krieger criticism links risk aversion to an
imposed mental staleness and rigidity that impedes the advocate's
role.
Pitfalls pedagogy, focusing on similar concerns about giving value
to clients, takes a differing view of risk as law students and lawyers
perceive it. Brest and Krieger are surely right to suggest that a curric-
ulum mis-educates whenever it uses precedent, the case method, the
adversary system, and other mainstays to relate a sense of futility and
to teach the power to demolish another person's ideas, rather than
the equally valuable power to create new ones. But this sense of de-
feat is not part of the pitfalls approach. On the contrary: talking to
students about contingencies ahead in the practice of law gives them a
boost of vigor and optimism, in the way that athletes planning for a
marathon or long bicycle ride seek out and relish any advance infor-
mation they can get about the hill, the stretch of potholes, or the bad
neighborhood on their route. Specifics matter. "You'll have a rotten
time; the road is awful" is not a pitfalls message, especially when it
hovers unspoken in the air. "Look out for X, Y, and Z when you take
off," by contrast, anticipates a satisfying journey.
Pitfalls are more than figurative potholes. They offer opportuni-
ties. Consider the topics surveyed in the last Part. Involuntary dis-
qualification, for example, functions as a blow to the lawyer with the
conflict, but for the initiator it is a weapon. Judicial codes of conduct
can serve as weapons too. Retained lawyers prosecute and defend-
that is, profit from-claims for legal malpractice. Ineffective assis-
tance of counsel can give a litigator the memorable thrill of invalidat-
104 Paul Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching ProfessionalJudgment, 69 WASH. L. REv. 527,
541 (1994).
105 Id. at 540.
106 Id.
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ing a client's criminal conviction. Lawyers endure the penalties of
disciplinary sanctions, but they also write, threaten, impose, celebrate,
and review them.
B. Assonance with the Rest of the Curriculum
One problem with the mandate requiring instruction in profes-
sional responsibility is that it has given birth to an anomalous course
and a burdensome teaching assignment. Most law schools omit this
class from their first-year requirements and compel students to take it
in the semester of their choice between completion of the first year
and graduation.' 0 7 This placement away from most other require-
ments forces the course to compete for esteem in the schedule with
courses that students take because they are interested in a subject. 108
Second-year students enroll in the belief (sometimes misplaced) that
the course can help them with the Multistate Professional Responsibil-
ity Examination, a test they may take, in a "get it out of the way" fash-
ion, before they graduate. Graduating students enroll having run out
of semesters in which they can put it off. No other law school class is
regarded-by students, faculty, and associate deans alike-as this
much of a chronic nuisance, and instructors who teach it have been
resenting its unpopularity in print for years. 10 9
Pitfalls can assuage the unpopularity problem by bringing Profes-
sional Responsibility or Legal Profession in line with other law school
courses. Elsewhere in their schedules, students learn that dangers and
obstacles occupy virtually every corner of the law; because references
to pitfalls make this class look more like its peers, the burden of being
an anomaly in the eyes of students is eased. Once students perceive
that this class really does belong on their schedule, those who teach it,
107 See Julie A. Oseid, It Happened to Me: Sharing Personal Value Dilemmas to Teach Profes-
sionalism and Ethics, 12J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 105, 111-12 (2006) (contending that this
belated placement causes law students to underrate the importance of the subject).
108 See Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About It, 60
VAND. L. REv. 609, 655-57 (2007) (noting the isolation of professional responsibility in the
curriculum).
109 SeeJohn M. Conley, How Bad Is It Out There? Teaching and Learning About the State of
the Legal Profession in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1943, 1950-51 (2004); Roger C. Cram-
ton & Susan P. Koniak, Rule, Story, and Commitment in the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 145, 146-47 (1996) ("[L]egal ethics remains an unloved orphan of legal
education. 'Serious scholarship' in legal ethics is still considered somewhat of an oxymo-
ron. Many law school faculties remain convinced that the subject is unteachable or believe
that it is not worth teaching.") (citations omitted); Mary C. Daly, Bruce A. Green & Russell
G. Pearce, Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 195 n.6 (1995) (quoting sources calling the class "a blowoff
course," a "dog," and "hard to teach, disappointing to take, and often presented to vacant
seats or vacant minds"); William H. Simon, The Trouble with Legal Ethics, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
65, 65-66 (1991); Dennis Turner, Infusing Ethical, Moral, and Religious Values into a Law
School Curriculum: A Modest Proposal, 24 U. DAYTON L. REv. 283, 291-92 (1999).
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now less vexed by challenges to the legitimacy of their material, be-
come better positioned to advance other pedagogical aims beyond
pitfalls.1 10
To see how pitfalls-thinking pervades American legal education,
consider first-year required courses as described by the institution that
has had the most influence on American law school curricula. At
Harvard Law School, the course on Criminal Law puts "special empha-
sis on the phenomenon of discretion,"' I Ia large source of risk for
lawyers as well as defendants. In Contracts, instructors ask "whether
and when contracts should be voided because of duress, nondisclo-
sure, a failure to read, unconscionability, or immorality."' 1 2 Civil Pro-
cedure notes "tensions underlying an evolving adversarial system of
adjudication."' 13 Property warns landholders about the pitfalls of
"zoning, health and safety regulations, protection of minority or eco-
nomically disadvantaged groups, eminent domain, and taxes."' 1 4 The
three "fundamental theories of liability" in Torts-"intentional inter-
ference, negligence, and strict liability"' 15-announce that legal re-
sponsibility for injury will be governed by three very different, almost
mutually exclusive, categorical conceptions, which in turn suggests pit-
falls for both actors trying to comport with tort law and lawyers who
presumably will suffer if they misapply the rubrics.
Other large-enrollment courses share the same preoccupation
with danger and particular trouble-spots to be foreseen. The business
curriculum, for example, spends much of its time on failure, bank-
ruptcy, lack of candor, and fights over governance. (By contrast, simi-
larly titled courses in business schools consider methods to attract
investment, expand, innovate, and provide returns on capital.) The
course on Evidence works with the general pitfall of inadmissibility
along with specifics: unreliability, uncertainty, deterioration, privilege,
prejudice, impeachment, human frailty, limitations derived from the
Bill of Rights, and other vexations. Administrative Law portrays an
epic struggle among individuals, legislatures, courts, and agencies,
where each sector can be the others' pitfall. Tax courses see pitfalls
everywhere, especially in the happy occasions of reaping profits and
income. Law school landmines are under everyone's feet, and instruc-
110 See infra Part III.B.
111 Harvard Law Sch., Criminal Law 4, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/
courses/2008-09/?id=5194 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
112 Id. Contracts 1, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/2008-09/?id=
5260 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
113 Id. Civil Procedure 1, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/2007-08/?
id=4719 (last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
114 Id. Property 1, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/2007-08/?id=4723
(last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
115 Id. Torts 1, http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/courses/2008-09/?id=5181
(last visited Oct. 23, 2008).
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tors teaching a class on professional responsibility who know that their
students are taking or have recently taken a particular course can raise
pertinent comparisons.
III
LEARNING ABOUT ETHICS, AND FULFILLING OTHER
MANDATES, USING PITFALLS
Although the accreditation rule mandates instruction about "the
legal profession" rather than lawyers' ethics, 1 6 law school curricula
see professional ethics as an important constituent of the required
course-and so, regardless of whether it fits with the preparation for
work thesis of this Essay,1 17 ethics in the practice of law warrants atten-
tion in any study of professional responsibility pedagogy. The salience
of ethics is unlikely to diminish: many casebooks for the course, espe-
cially newer ones, have "ethics" or "ethical" in their titles1 18 and all pay
at least some attention to questions of right and wrong action for
lawyers.
A pitfalls approach to professional responsibility strengthens this
theme in the course. Pitfalls are always relevant to ethics in the prac-
tice of law. As the second section of this Part elaborates, this ap-
proach also helps to advance the various pedagogical agendas that
innovative instructors have presented in the professional responsibil-
ity literature.
Given these large claims about what a pitfalls pedagogy can do, it
may be helpful at this point to review the elements of this approach.
An instructor depicts the rules and doctrine of professional responsi-
bility in terms of immediate, concrete perils for lawyers. Recurring
questions for the classroom may appear inattentive to right and wrong
because they focus more directly on getting caught. "What kind of
trouble could you get into if you proceed? Has an opponent taken a
misstep, and if so, how might the lawyer respond? What can the judge
do to the lawyer, and what can the lawyer do to the judge? Suppose
you're the lawyer: if you fail, what adverse consequences might follow?
116 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 22, Standard 302(a) (5); see also Andrews, supra note
29, at 96 n.3 (distinguishing "legal ethics" from the rules of professional conduct); Linda S.
Mullenix, Mass Tort As Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 579, 584
n.16 (1994) (estimating that the large majority of instructors teach "the course as a code
course, or a 'lawyering' course, not an ethics course").
117 See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. For a cautionary note on conflating
legal ethics with disciplinary rules and the law governing lawyers, see W. BRADLEY WENDEL,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 4 (2004).
118 See, e.g., PAUL T. HAYDEN, ETHICAL LAWYERING: LEGAL AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITIES IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2003); HAZARD ET AL., supra note 14 (entitled The Law and
Ethics of Lawyering); LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRAC-
TICE OF LAW (2005); SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. Fox, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL
MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2008).
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If you succeed, what adverse consequences might follow? Now that we
have seen the unfortunate story unfold, in hindsight which pitfalls did
the lawyer fail to anticipate?" Some instructors might feel more com-
fortable covering ethics by, so to speak, rushing to judgment: they
would truncate analysis by asking the class to condone or condemn an
outcome. Yet by inviting participants to take the role of a lawyer and
thereby develop a sense of dangers, this pedagogy starts with the par-
ticulars necessary for thorough evaluation.
A. The Centrality of Consequences to Ethics
"In the philosophical tradition," writes W. Bradley Wendel, "eth-
ics is the study of concepts such as goodness, right action, duty, and
what ends we ought to choose and pursue, as rational beings."' 19 Phi-
losophy classifies ethics for lawyers under the aegis of normative ethics
(rather than the more abstract "metaethics"), also known as "morals"
or "substantive ethics." 120 The philosophical endeavor may be stated
in the overlapping questions it seeks to answer: What is right and
wrong? What is blameworthy and praiseworthy? What is desirable or
worthwhile? How should we live? 121
1. Normative Ethics As Professional Responsibility Sees It: Pitfalls As
Part of Consequentialism and Deontology
When considering problems of ethics, the professional responsi-
bility tradition is to look at two sources in the philosophical tradition:
"competing alternative visions of moral theory, dividing largely along
consequentialist and deontological lines," 122 or "utilitarianism and
Kant's categorical imperative."'123 Our custom is to note both alterna-
tives without favoring one, staying neutral on which is more compel-
ling because "[w] e have.., no 'thick theory of the good.' " 124 Happily
for a defender of pitfalls pedagogy, this approach to professional re-
sponsibility comports with both alternatives. The link between the pit-
falls notion of consequences and the philosophical notion of
consequentialism is easier to see, because the words align, but a pit-
falls pedagogy is equally central to deontology and Kant.
119 WENDEL, supra note 117, at 3.
120 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 118 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
121 See id. at 121.
122 Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor Clients, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2475, 2505 n.126 (1999).
123 Id. (citing MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 3-26 (4th ed.
1997)). For an argument that hewing only to these two traditions has impoverished the
study of legal ethics, see Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good
Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 887-88 (1996) (arguing that the traditional
dichotomy slights the contributions available from virtue ethics).
124 Tremblay, supra note 122, at 2505 n.126 (quoting William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice
and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REv. 213, 225 (1991)).
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Putting the terms consequentialism and utilitarianism together
for this purpose, we can readily identify the value of using pitfalls to
convey fidelity to the prescriptions of utilitarianism. Teaching rules to
students through a utilitarian lens invokes "rule utilitarianism," which
invites judgments of a rule with reference to the criterion of how
much good will occur when the rule is followed.1 25 Virtually every
rule of professional conduct is amenable to this analysis, and a pitfalls
approach makes the study concrete. One could teach the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct entirely as rule utilitarianism, asking
students to imagine universal acceptance of its provisions and antici-
pating the consequences for the profession, clients, and the public.
Rule utilitarianism and pitfalls come together in course material
beyond the Model Rules. For example, as mentioned above, some
fields of work make lawyers vulnerable to legal malpractice claims
while for other groups of lawyers, this sanction is entirely hypothetical;
in some jurisdictions public defenders enjoy immunity from malprac-
tice liability. 126 Justifying the status quo of divergences in this pitfall
requires a rule-utilitarian conclusion that the threat of malpractice lia-
bility is either a good or a bad thing depending on what kind of work
the lawyer does. Rule utilitarianism also engages the pitfalls tenet that
dangers also constitute opportunities (for example, the filing of a
Rule 11 motion for sanctions is of itself subject to Rule 11)127 and that
absences of danger constitute absences of opportunity (no, you proba-
bly cannot get your client's conviction overturned on ineffectiveness
grounds). 128 Danger, lack of danger, opportunity, and lack of oppor-
tunity for classes of lawyers amount to distribution of utilities.
Some authorities regard the rule-utilitarian strand of utilitarian-
ism as "a modified version of deontological ethics,"1 29 which brings us
to Kantian thought, or deontology. Pitfalls are central here too, the
supposed disdain for consequences in this tradition notwithstand-
ing.130 One cannot omit consequences from the Kantian injunction
"never to act except in such a way . . . that [one's] maxim should
125 THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY Ov PHILOSOPHY 543-44 (Thomas Mautner ed., 2d ed.
2005).
126 See supra note 52.
127 See Bennett v. Prime TV, LLC, No. 1:02CV0611, 2003 "AL 21077130, at *1-2
(M.D.N.C. May 9, 2003); Curto v. Smith, 248 F. Supp. 2d 132, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Fashion
House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 124 F.R.D. 15, 22 (D.R.I. 1988).
128 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
129 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 120, at 343.
130 IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 18-19
(Thomas Kingsmill Abbott trans., Arc Manor 2008) (1785) (contending that the moral
worth of an action cannot be measured by its consequences).
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become a universal law.'' 1 l The rightness or wrongness of an action
depends on the outcome of an analysis.
Legal scholars and philosophers have worked hard to correct the
erroneous notion that Kant did not care about outcomes. 132 "The
conclusion that consequences are foreign to the Kantian way of think-
ing about crime and punishment represents a total perversion of
Kantian thought," writes George Fletcher, reacting to "sophisticated
thinkers" who misread Kant to say that attempts should be punished
as severely as consummated offenses.' 33 Indeed, unless one wishes to
halt deontological inquiry at the actions that Kant himself pondered
in the nineteenth century-killing, lying, robbery-and thereby have
nothing to say about dilemmas raised in contemporary life, any ques-
tion of legal ethics needs to attend to consequences (if only to investi-
gate whether considerations of duty are present) before a "universal
law" of how to act can emerge.
2. Pitfalls As a Constituent of Moral Development
The sometimes-controversial developmental theorist Lawrence
Kohlberg can make a noncontroversial contribution to a study of pit-
falls as pedagogy.134 Kohlberg laid out a famous sequence of six
moral development stages through which human beings pass.' 3 5 The
sequence becomes controversial in the middle: some critics contend
that the fourth stage may not represent an advance over the third.' 3 6
We may bypass the quarrel here by focusing on the first two stages and
treating the third and fourth, "conventional morality," as a unit. The
lesson from Kohlberg is that human beings move from the preceding
two stages of moral development, united as "preconventional moral-
131 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 15 (Mary Gregor
ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785).
132 SeeJACQUES THIROUX, ETHICS THEORY AND PRACTICE 47-48 (6th ed. 1998) (discuss-
ing Kant's attention to consequences); Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforce-
able Contract and Lease Terms, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 845, 848 n.7 (1988) ("Certainly Kant noted
consequences."); id. at 856 n.30 (observing that in several writings Kant took "notice of the
results of doing one's duty or even the results in determining one's duty"); David Luban,
Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-Course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49
MD. L. REv. 424, 440 (1990) (noting that "a Kantian applying the generalization test must
look to the real-world consequences of a universal permission to act in a certain way").
133 George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 687,
696 (2000).
134 See Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for Pure
Economic Loss, 48 ARiz. L. REV. 773, 794 n.113 (2006) (proposing to "put aside controversy-
Kohlberg and stay within consensus-Kohlberg"). On the relevance of Kohlberg to under-
standing lawyers' ethics, see Elliott M. Abramson, Puncturing the Myth of the Moral Intractabil-
ity of Law Students: The Suggestiveness of the Work of Psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg ]or Ethical
Training in Legal Education, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 223 passim (1993).
135 Abramson, supra note 134, at 224.
136 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 18 (35th prtg. 1998).
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ity," to the conventional-morality understanding that they are mem-
bers of society.
The pitfalls pedagogy, presented here as a graduate-level tech-
nique to teach intelligent and motivated adults, rests on the earliest
stage of moral development, Stage One, the level characterized by a
"punishment and obedience orientation."'3 7 In this first stage, young
children understand wrongness by the punishments they encounter.
As they develop, they become aware that other people hold moral sta-
tus (Stage Two), and later become positioned to recognize the neces-
sity of social order when they move to the third stage. Law students
outgrew Stage One long ago, of course. 138 At a minimum they once
wrote (or at least turned in under their own name) a good-enough
personal statement or application essay that made some reference to
law, politics, social order, or communal welfare. In its frequent refer-
ences to law as a source and instrument of "policy"-heard through-
out the academy, not only in elite institutions-legal education
presupposes that students have reached the fourth stage and are
headed higher than "conventional morality."'3-9
The pitfalls pedagogy reaches the same heights as legal education
generally, while also keeping its feet on the ground. It always engages
with what lawyers perceive as their own occupational punishments and
rewards. With these responses to antecedents at the fore, students are
able to think concretely about the function of motives and incentives
for lawyers as constituents of policy. At the same time, the pitfalls
pedagogy does not hold students back (unless the pedagogy is misap-
plied) in a primitive "whatever you do, don't get caught" perversion of
ethics: teaching pitfalls does not stop at saying what these pitfalls are,
but also opens discussions about why, how, and at what cost they
loom.
B. Pitfalls As an Instrument in Other Professional Responsibility
Pedagogies
The pitfalls approach serves as both a pedagogy of its own and a
device that supports other approaches in the classroom. Experienced
and distinguished instructors have published an array of strategies for
teaching students about this profession that make reference to occu-
pational hazards but do not focus on them explicitly as pitfalls. Here I
focus on six of the best-known approaches to the professional respon-
137 RONALD DusKA & MARIELLEN WHELAN, MORAL DEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE TO PIAGET
AND KOHLBERG 45-47 (1975).
138 See generally Steven Hartwell, Moral Growth or Moral Angst? A Clinical Approach, 11
CLINICAL L. REV. 115, 118-20 (2004) (describing the gap in legal pedagogy between con-
ventional morality and postconventional morality, located beyond Stage Four).
139 I draw this conclusion from my own experiences of speaking and teaching at a
range of law schools ranked in all four tiers of a notorious hierarchy.
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sibility course-clinical education, experiential instruction, pervasive
instruction, specific contexts, philosophy of lawyering, and sociology
of the profession-to suggest uses for pitfalls in classes that gather the
material under a variety of rubrics.
1. Clinical Education
Some observers deem law school clinics the ideal venue for teach-
ing legal ethics and professional responsibility. 140 Representing real
clients while also receiving traditional classroom instruction unites
theory and practice: 'Judgment is the product of this ongoing synthe-
sis of experience and reflection. '14 1
Writers who find the law school clinic well suited to furnishing
instruction about legal ethics and professional responsibility offer ex-
amples that look like pitfalls. Just as clinical legal education generally
delivers instruction in the form of student experiences, clinical legal
education about pitfalls presents burdens, dilemmas, and tough ques-
tions to students as action items that need action now, by them. For
example, overlapping work in a school clinic with work for an outside
employer gives the student a chance to fulfill mundane yet crucial du-
ties relating to conflicts of interest. A clinic can facilitate creation of
documents and systems to gather information about each student's
concurrent and recent employment and also relay information about
the clinic's clients for students to share with their outside employ-
ers. 142 When traditional faculty collaborate with students and clinical
instructors on work for the clinic's clients, sometimes at the behest of
a student-for example, one might ask the tax professor whether a
client's anticipated award is taxable income-the student is exposed
to vivid pitfalls concerning the attorney-client relationship, confidenti-
ality, and unauthorized practice, among other possibilities. 143
140 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. Rv. 851,
857 (2004) (describing one clinic "devoted to the values of ethical judgment, professional
responsibility, and public service in law and society") (citations omitted); William Berman,
When Will They Ever Learn? Learning and Teaching From Mistakes in the Clinical Context, 13
CLINICAL L. REv. 115, 136 (2006) (emphasizing the relation between legal ethics and
clinical education). Much of this literature comes from Canada, see Hartwell, supra note
138, at 143 n.75, an unsurprising pedigree given the Canadian practice of requiring "arti-
cling," or apprenticeship, before a law school graduate can join the bar.
141 David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 64 (1995).
142 Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency Issues in Law Clinic
PFadiUe, 9 CLINICAL L. RE.v. -9,, 0,,0-78 ( (pr iding two appendices o clinicsto
share with enrolled students).
143 This "(not so) hypothetical situation" occupies much of the analysis in Laura L.
Rovner, The Unforeseen Ethical Ramifications of Classroom Faculty Participation in Law School
Clinics, 75 U. CIN. L. REv. 1113, 1121 (2007).
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2. Experiential Instruction Outside of a Clinic
Some instructors applaud the theory and practice pedagogy of a
law school clinic as a vehicle for teaching ethics, yet insist that clinics
alone cannot cover the subject. For them, simulations or pre-scripted
exercises have the real-time, trench-like advantages of clinical educa-
tion at a somewhat lower cost and with more instructor control. 144
The leading advocate of experiential instruction in professional re-
sponsibility has gone further, proposing "the near-total elimination of
live-client, in-house clinics"'145 in favor of an experience rich, multi-
semester sequence consisting of "(1) a long-term comprehensive sim-
ulation; (2) case, rule, and material reading with attendant classroom
discussion; and (3) live-practice placements."'1 46 A friendly reviewer of
this suggestion estimated that it allots 25 percent of students' total
time in law school to simulations courses. 147
As with clinical education, the principal mode taught in experien-
tial learning is pitfalls. 148 By focusing on specific junctures as a repre-
sentation progresses, this pedagogy conveys ethics and professional
responsibility primarily via "the thousand natural shocks that flesh is
heir to," the "daily dilemmas that lawyers face. 1 49 The pedagogy is
particularly strong in teaching what James Moliterno calls "trade us-
age," which is another key pitfall in the practice of law that can, for
example, render a particular statement in negotiation acceptable in
family practice but unacceptable in labor practice or vice versa.150
3. "Pervasive" Instruction
The belief that good law schools teach professional responsibility
day in and day out along with the rest of their curricula-making seg-
regation of the subject in its own separate course superfluous at best-
144 Dennis Turner notes that in clinics, time crunches arise if a student hurrying to
finish a complaint or the preparation of a witness barely has time to reflect on ethics, and
instructors lack control of the ethics issues that will reveal themselves over the academic
year; moreover, high faculty/student ratios in clinics make these programs too expensive
as a means to teach a required subject. Turner, supra note 109, at 292-93; see also
Moliterno, supra note 27, at 116-17 (arguing that every educational advantage that clinics
now deliver can be delivered better by a combination of simulations and externships).
Experiential education gained national attention in March 2008 when Washington & Lee
University School of Law announced that the third year of its J.D. program would hence-
forth be entirely experiential. See Dean Rod Smolla, Wash. and Lee Univ. Sch. of Law, A
Message from the Dean, http://law.wlu.edu/thirdyear.
145 Moliterno, supra note 27, at 77.
146 Id. at 106.
147 Kenney F. Hegland, Jim's Modest Proposal, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 125, 128 (1996).
148 At one point Moliterno says as much. See Moliterno, supra note 27, at 105 (sug-
gesting that the experiential mode in a torts or products liability class should emphasize
"the potential pitfalls inherent in personal injury representation or insurance defense").
149 Hegland, supra note 147, at 131.
150 Moliterno, supra note 27, at 103-04.
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has a long history.15 1 Deborah Rhode has led a movement advocating
the teaching of lawyers' "ethics by the pervasive method," a deliberate
effort to instill what had been seen as an ambient condition, occur-
ring naturally, before the onset of a required course in the 1970s.1 52
Rhode turns the old description of professional responsibility into
prescription: "Professional responsibility questions should be ad-
dressed in all substantive courses because they arise in all substantive
fields, and because their resolution implicates values that are central
to lawyers' personal and professional lives."'15 3
Like the experiential education proposed by Moliterno, this state-
ment of purpose strenuously rejects business-as-usual in a law school:
instructors who teach "all substantive courses" must either cooperate
voluntarily with the "pervasive" plan or be ordered to comply. After
they fall in line, questions of what and how to teach in their class-
rooms arise. 154 Few American law faculties have been open to this
costly investment.1 55 Those that make this choice would find pitfalls
an effective way to isolate topics for attention in each substantive
course: pitfalls and the pervasive method are united by their common
desire to align professional responsibility instruction with the larger
curriculum.
For any course, the pervasive method of instruction would begin
with pitfalls from the law of lawyering a56 and then link these dangers
to the substantive ends that a particular body of law pursues. The
study necessarily encounters collisions. For example, judicial applica-
tions of contract doctrine to construe a disputed agreement are im-
peded, rather than enhanced, by the advocate-witness rule. The ban
on contingent fees in matrimonial cases appears to advance some of
the aims of matrimonial law (encouraging reconciliation, reducing
151 See MICHAELJ. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 8 (1980) (describing
Harvard's "disdain" for teaching a single ethics course). For a survey of the same themes in
business education, see Thomas R. Piper, A Program to Integrate Leadership, Ethics, and Corpo-
rate Responsibility into Management Education, in CAN ETHICS BE TAUGHT? PERSPECTIVES,
CHALLENGES, AND APPROACHES AT HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 117, 117 (Thomas R. Piper et
al. eds., 1993).
152 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD (2d ed. 1998).
153 University of San Francisco Center for Applied Ethics, How Do Others Teach?,
http://wv.usfca.edu/legalethics/methods.html (summarizing Rhode's method).
154 Rhode's sympathetic dean, to whom Ethics by the Pervasive Method is dedicated, re-
views some of these difficulties in Paul Brest, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Grab Bag:
Complementary Curriculum, Collaboration, and the Pervasive Method, 50 FLA. L. REV. 753, 754-55
(1998).
155 For accounts from people who have tried it, noting its limitations and its promise,
see id. passim; Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Richard H. Sander, The "Infusion"Method at UCLA:
Teaching Ethics Pervasively, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129, 135 (1995).
156 This phrase comes from a casebook title. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 14.
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overt strife) and to defeat others (fostering fairness for the poorer
party, enhancing zeal). 157
The pervasive method is stellar-much better than a stand-alone
course-at remembering that issues of professional responsibility
arise when a lawyer is trying to do something else. In a course on
corporations, for instance, the instructor mandated to include topics
covered in the Model Rules (for example, confidentiality and conflicts
of interest) will be inclined to present them in contexts where lawyers
will face trouble when they hew to the disciplinary rule. Part of what is
pervasive about pitfalls is that they extend beyond disciplinary law;
both the pitfalls approach and the pervasive method seek out breadth.
4. Specific Contexts
This approach to teaching professional responsibility, as an-
nounced by leaders of one noted ethics center, calls for "a new genre
of courses" to 'join the pervasive method and the traditional survey
course." 158 Students focus on the legal profession in particular spe-
cialty. Examples of contexts that have filled freestanding alternative
classes on professional responsibility at Fordham Law School include
public interest law, criminal advocacy, and business transactions.' 59
Robert Granfield and Thomas Koenig make a different plea for con-
text, more polemical and less specific, in that it focuses overtly on jus-
tice and politics. They find the professional responsibility curriculum
hollow-and also bad at preparing students for practice-whenever it
ignores the force of external pressures on a lawyer's work. 160
Any reference to context, including these two near-opposites,
necessarily brings in pitfalls. The Fordham experience nicely illus-
trates the two sides of the danger/opportunity coin by noting the
function of student choice in fulfilling the graduation requirement.
The choice to take the basic survey course gives students a sense of
freedom to follow their own interests, but also might make them
worry that they have chosen the wrong context or opted too soon for
specialization. Instructors and curriculum designers savor the chance
to dig deeper but wonder whether they are failing to convey some
urgent point that the survey course would have covered. 16 Overt at-
157 See RHODE, supra note 152, at 697-99.
158 Daly, Green & Pearce, supra note 109, at 193.
159 Id. at 202-06.
160 See Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It's Hard to Be a Human Being and a Law-
yer": Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA.
L. REv. 495, 520 (2003).
161 See Daly, Green & Pearce, supra note 109, at 200-01.
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tention to political power, as commended by Granfield and Koenig,
also comports with pitfalls pedagogy. 162
5. A "Philosophy of Lawyering"
Nathan Crystal has urged instructors and students of professional
responsibility to reflect on what he sees as an imperative to each law-
yer: to form "a philosophy of lawyering" that guides the lawyer
through dilemmas that are "not clearly answered by the rules of pro-
fessional conduct or the law governing lawyers," brings together the
lawyer's professional role and personal life, and involves the lawyer "in
institutional issues facing the profession."1 63 For Crystal, "the neces-
sity for lawyers to develop a philosophy of lawyering" was the "funda-
mental theme" of his popular casebook. 164 Elaborating on this theme
in a law review article, Crystal proposed that each state should compel
lawyers to state in writing his or her philosophy of lawyering as a con-
dition of bar admission, to re-certify this statement each year when
paying bar dues, and to furnish clients and prospective clients with a
written statement explaining this philosophy. 65 The last portion of
the proposal, notice to clients about one's philosophy of lawyering, is
the most important to Crystal. 166
Notice to clients is central because, as stated by the architect of
this pedagogy, the chief issue that "a philosophy of lawyering" raises
for lawyers is their discretion to veer from the partisan interests of the
persons and entities they represent. 167 Before clients sign a retainer
agreement, Crystal wants lawyers to tell them several things: on what
basis the lawyer takes and declines new work; the scope of counseling
he or she will provide; which circumstances would impel the lawyer to
withdraw from representing a client on the ground that the client is
"acting immorally"; whether the lawyer would prevent a client from
doing harm to others or act on behalf of a client in a way that would
harm others; and on what basis the lawyer would exercise "profes-
sional discretion on behalf of a client." 168
162 Granfield & Koenig, supra note 160, at 507-09, 523 (recommending that the
course convey some of the "management strategies" recounted to the authors in their
study of forty graduates of Harvard Law School asked to describe their own professional
encounters with political power and social injustice).
163 NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE
PROFESSION 51 (3d ed. 2004).
164 Id. at xxv.
165 Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. FOLY 75, 94-97 (2000).
166 Crystal offered to withdraw the condition-of-licensing part of his proposal should
critics deem it too much of an affront to lawyers' free speech rights. Id. at 101.
167 Id. at 86-92.
168 Id. at 96.
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When we discard for this purpose one extra item at the end of
Crystal's list-" [plarticipation in pro bono, law reform, and other pro-
fessional activities to improve the law" 169-which comes across (to me
at least) as an anodyne afterthought that most prospective clients
would not especially care to know about, we see the strong overlap
between "a philosophy of lawyering" and pitfalls. Crystal worries that
inattentive readers might dismiss his proposal as "touchy-feely non-
sense," 170 which is what it would amount to if complying lawyers were
permitted to file boilerplate rhetoric that extolled excellence, integ-
rity, high standards,justice, public service, and so on. Only the specif-
ics about lawyer discretion that Crystal raises-"What would you do?
Who would you turn away at the door? When would you quit?"-give
meaning to "a philosophy of lawyering," which would otherwise be as
bland and hollow as the old buzzword "professionalism." An individ-
ual's philosophy of lawyering can include many parts, but its center is
a concatenation of predictions about what this lawyer would do in a
tight spot when no course of action offers safety and the stakes are
high.
6. Sociology of the Profession
Before the reader leaps to infer that a pitfalls pedagogy will fulfill
any and every agenda with respect to the teaching of professional re-
sponsibility, a word about one potentially discordant approach is in
order. Several commentators commend the teaching of professional
responsibility in a sociological context.1 71 Of the six pedagogies re-
viewed in this section, the sociological one may hew most closely to
the ABA mandate that launched this Essay; it provides overt instruc-
tion on "the history, goals, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities
of the legal profession and its members."1 72
Legal sociologist Elizabeth Chambliss argues that attention to the
sociology of this profession does not neglect lawyers' ethics. On the
contrary, she says: the pressures and constraints that fill this milieu are
unintelligible unless one takes into account the force of groups and
organizations:
[T]he sociological approach does expose students to important
moral issues, but it focuses on the moral responsibilities of the pro-
fession as a whole, and of lawyers as members of a profession, rather
169 Id.
170 Id. at 98.
171 See Chambliss, supra note 44, passim; Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Do-
ing the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching Professional Responsibility, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75,
85-86 (1991); Posting of Bill Henderson to Empirical Legal Studies, A Plug for the Eco-
nomics and Sociology of the Legal Profession, http://www.elsblog.org/the-empirical-le-
gal_studi/2006/04/a-plug-for-the_.html (Apr. 30, 2006, 9:09 EST).
172 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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than treating individual lawyers as if they operated independently of
any organizational or professional context. The sociological ap-
proach thus makes explicit the organizational, professional and so-
cietal implications of lawyers' individual actions, as well as alerting
students to the external pressures that can lead to unethical behav-
iors. In my view, this approach better-equips students to identify
and address the moral implications of their individual practice than
a course organized around abstract issues of individual morality. 173
Never having tried the sociological approach in the classroom, I
sense that it may appear to eschew pitfalls but actually sees them every-
where in this profession. Attention to groups and systems rather than
individuals may seem static to outsiders habituated to think of change
or stress as originating in a person's consciousness. The cohort of
individualists may be pleased to read about legal sociologists that disa-
gree and attribute stasis and resistance to misguided beliefs about "in-
dividual professional autonomy. '174
An instructor could teach a sociology-of-the-profession version of
professional responsibility without any mention of pitfalls that lawyers
face as they do their jobs. More likely, however, this instructor would
embrace pitfalls. In one version of a sociology-informed course, for
example, an introduction about comparative sources of regulation-
including disciplinary law, civil liability, legislation, and agency over-
sight-segues into an extended exercise in which class participants
write an ethics code for law students (or, alternatively, an explanation
of why no such code is necessary) along with an enforcement scheme.
This pedagogy uncannily resembles the beginning of this Essay, which
also started with institutional controls.
CONCLUSION
When songwriter and social critic Tom Lehrer found himself
sharing hotel space with a convention of Boy Scout leaders, he was
inspired to laugh at their notion of anticipating what might go wrong:
Be prepared! That's the Boy Scouts' marching song,
Be prepared! As through life you march along
Be prepared to hold your liquor pretty well.
Don't write naughty words on walls if you can't spell.
173 Chambliss, supra note 44, at 854.
174 See Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Profes-
sional, and Socio-Economic Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behav-
ior in Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 773, 794 (1998) (lamenting the tendency of
managing partners at large law firms to regard attorney misconduct as an individual aber-
ration); see also Chambliss, supra note 44, at 854 (identifying situational sources of unethi-
cal behaviors); Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudence and Public Interest Law, 25
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHAINGE 487, 491 (1999) (referring to "the new institutionalism" to
argue that rules "shape cognition and enact meaning").
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If you're looking for adventure of a new and different kind
And you come across a Girl Scout who is similarly inclined
Don't be nervous, don't be flustered, don't be scared! Be
prepared!17 5
Urging law teachers to warn students about what lies ahead of
them in the practice of law may seem as risible as the Scout motto or a
curriculum of Don't Get Caught. Where's the aspiration? Whatever
happened to our lofty ideals? 176
The pitfalls pedagogy has several responses to this hypothetical
rhetorical dismay, all of which share the premise that instruction in
professional responsibility should, indeed, teach high principles. For
starters, we who teach law can look in the mirror when we answer one
book's query: "Who among us will do the right thing?"'17 7 Enjoying as
we do the fruits of tuition revenue and professional status-and hav-
ing constrained our students' prerogatives by requiring them to study
their profession-we owe instruction in how lawyers can look out for
their own occupational welfare. Manifesting concern about the op-
portunities and dangers that students face after graduation presents
legal educators as lawyers working to fulfill their own professional re-
sponsibility, thereby providing students a model of the client service
that instructors are training them to render. 7 8
In the classroom, speaking about pitfalls offers small building
blocks that an instructor can assemble to create a structure of consid-
erable loft. Take for example a pitfalls approach to one topic covered
in virtually every version of the required course in professional re-
sponsibility: former-client conflicts of interest. Under-enforcement of
Model Rule 1.9 and its neighboring Rule 1.10 makes the blackletter
less than a real pitfall for the lawyer with a conflict, but other dangers
and opportunities related to conflicts abound-as class time spent on
the malpractice-liability or judicial-disqualification pitfall will indicate.
From these particulars an instructor can move to abstractions, ideals,
and policy on the subject, knowing that students have envisioned
themselves as lawyers burdened with conflicting representations.
Without the guidance of pitfalls for individual lawyers, this topic is a
place for students to get bored and lost in the mists of pseudo-algebra:
"Okay, lawyer L in firm X represented corporation C, and now attor-
175 Tom Lehrer, Be Prepared, on TOM LEHRER REVISITED (Warner Bros. & Reprise
Records 1990).
176 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (finding nostalgia in writings about the
decline of the profession).
177 HAzARD ET AL., supra note 14, at 3.
178 See Schuwerk, supra note 4, passim (arguing that law professors owe their students
fiduciary duties).
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ney A, the partner of lawyer L in firm X, wants to represent business
B ......
A pitfalls pedagogy gives law students the vantage point from
which to see any topic of professional responsibility both as a quick
prod for a lawyer and in all its depth. By talking about problems for
lawyers as sources of strategy and strength, and commending vigor in
response to a setback, the pedagogy combats a tendency toward anxi-
ety and unhappiness that wafts through law schools. 179 Making refer-
ence to pitfalls functions as an approach of its own to professional
responsibility and also an adjuvant to other designs for teaching the
subject. °80 This approach unites the American legal curriculum.
179 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
180 See supra Part II.B.
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